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Bug 708483 - [PATCH] gkd: wrong/unintended size passed to read(2) in read_login_password
[PATCH] gkd: wrong/unintended size passed to read(2) in read_login_password
Status: RESOLVED FIXED
Product: gnome-keyring
Classification: Core
Component: general
git master
Other All
: Normal normal
: ---
Assigned To: GNOME keyring maintainer(s)
GNOME keyring maintainer(s)
Depends on:
Blocks:
 
 
Reported: 2013-09-20 18:15 UTC by Lars Seipel
Modified: 2013-09-23 15:05 UTC
See Also:
GNOME target: ---
GNOME version: ---

Attachments
Fix lapse where the login password is read in pointer-sized chunks (786 bytes, patch)
2013-09-20 18:15 UTC, Lars Seipel 		committed Details | Review

Description Lars Seipel 2013-09-20 18:15:28 UTC 
Created attachment 255436 [details] [review]
Fix lapse where the login password is read in pointer-sized chunks

While casually reading over gnome-keyring code something caught my eye: in read_login_password (daemon/gkd-main.c) an apparently non-sensical size is passed to read(2).

Read is called with sizeof(buf) as the third argument where the type of buf is gchar*. The consequences in this case are fairly minor: the function reads the login password in pointer-sized increments instead of using the actual capacity of the allocated buffer.

Nevertheless, why not just fix it? Find the patch attached.
Comment 1 Stef Walter 2013-09-23 15:05:25 UTC 
Thanks for the patch. Added to git master.