Hi.

(This is originally from #681668.)

The ifupdown plugins exports connections from /etc/network/interfaces (in managed mode).
So the user can enable/disable them, when he is e.g. determined to be locally logged on (e.g. using console-kit).

Per default, /etc/network/interfaces is world-readable, so the usual way to determine whether a user should be allowed to use connections seems enough.


But it's also possible that /etc/network/interfaces contains credentials (VPN keys or WPA keys for example) and that it is deliberately not readable by all users or even just by root.


Now even if NM doesn't show the normal users these credentials, it may be undesired, that the user is allowed to even connect.
Consider that this is a VPN and allows access to otherwise unsecured resources.


Therefore I suggest that we think about, whether additional conditions need to be met, for a user to actually use connections exported via /etc/network/interfaces.

I propose the following:
A user should be allowed to use the connections from /etc/network/interfaces if he can read /etc/network/interfaces, either by normal POSIX file permissions modes or by ACLs.


Cheers,
Chris.